Introduction
Our conception of meaning has become increasingly fragmented, along with much else in the increasing 'postmodernization' of our worldview. The trenches run deep between different kinds of meaning theories: mentalist, behaviorist, (neural) reductionist, (social) constructivist, functionalist, formalist, computationalist, deflationist… And they are so deep that a rational debate between the different camps seems impossible. The concept is treated not only differently but incommensurably within the different disciplines. Somewhat schematically, in order to emphasize the point, the interdisciplinary status of the concept 'meaning' can be summarized as follows.
In philosophy and linguistics meaning is (still) held to be a fundamental concept, even though it continues to be one of the most controversial and difficult ones. Some classical elucidations with very different outcomes are those of Frege (1997 Frege ( [1892 ), Saussure (1916) , Ogden and Richards (1923) , Wittgenstein (1953) and Grice (1957) . Until the present the debate goes on whether the ontological status of the concept is abstract, e.g. logical semantics in the tradition of Frege, physical, i.e. a matter of sign-world correspondences, (e.g. Barwise and Perry, 1983) , mental, (e.g. Jackendoff, 1983; Lakoff, 1987) or social, (e.g. Itkonen, 1997) .
In the social sciences (e.g. Kroeber, 1917; Durkheim, 1982) , meaning is regarded as fundamentally a property of the 'collective consciousnesses of a social group. But since it is more often assumed than argued that this collective consciousness determines the minds of individuals, and hardly ever explained how this is achieved, the relationship between meaning as a social and as a mental phenomenon is left unclear, as within the work of Saussure (1916) himself.
For most psychologists, on the other hand, the situation is reversed: Meaning is a property of the individual 'mind/brain' . The major internal century-long debate has concerned whether it is essentially a matter of 'behavioral dispositions' (e.g. Skinner, 1969) or 'mental models' (e.g. Johnson-Laird, 1983 ), a debate that has been rekindled with the comeback of neobehaviorism, finding support and a modern computational interpretation within 'connectionism' (e.g. Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986) .
In the 'sciences of the artificial' (artificial intelligence, artificial life, robotics) another kind of strategy seems to be preferred: the concept of meaning is 'deflated' and declared either superfluous or a matter of external attribution (e.g. Turing, 1950; Dennett 1987) .
Finally, while some researchers within the life sciences have tried to make use of the concept of meaning, in particular von Uexküll (1982 Uexküll ( [1940 ), Maturana and Varela (1980) and Edelman (1989 Edelman ( , 1992 , for most biologists the concept seems to smack of dualism, which of course is anathema for True Science.
A similar fragmentation of views appears to exist within the field that defines itself as the study of 'sign systems' , or sometimes of meaning in general: semiotics. For example, Emmeche (1999) distinguishes between the 'pansemiotics ' of Peirce (1931-35) , the 'biosemiotics' of von Uexküll (1982 Uexküll ( [1940 ) and the 'anthroposemiotics' of Saussure (1916) -depending on the whether the act of meaning-making, 'semiosis' , is regarded as being a characteristic of the Universe in general, of life, or of human societies, respectively.
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While a certain degree of perspectivism concerning a multi-faceted concept such as meaning is certainly healthy and perhaps even necessary, this extreme fragmentation of views concerning what is perhaps the most fundamental quality of human beings (and other living creatures) is hardly defensible. It is possibly therefore that since Harnad (1990) made the term popular, a recurrent theme has been to try to 'ground' meaning in some common (hard) currency, so to speak. The term 'grounding' , however, clearly has reductionist connotations, and so is Harnad's specific proposal for the 'sensorimotor grounding' of language: "The power of names and propositions is completely grounded in the sensorimotor interactions with the kinds of objects they designate, and the sensorimotor invariants on the basis of which the names are assigned." (Harnad, 1990, p. 23, my emphasis) In sum, it seems important to try to limit fragmentation and blatant inconsistencies in our self-understanding through a concept of meaning that is both integrative, and domain-sensitive. At the same time one should resist painting all cats grey 2 by reducing meaning to a single (preferably measurable) category such as 'information' , 'utility' , 'behavioral dispositions' etc. In this article I undertake the difficult task of trying to formulate a unified theory of meaning which is integrative and interdisciplinary without being reductionist, by taking an explicitly evolutionary and developmental perspective. The key tenets of this theory are the following two.
The first one is that all living systems and only living systems are capable of meaning. This is so because life implies the presence of intrinsic value, which constitutes the necessary and sufficient condition for meaning. One particular modern expression of this idea is provided by Cisek (1999) , who more or less echoes von Uexküll (1982 Uexküll ( [1940 ) when stating that:
Animals have physiological demands which inherently distinguish some input … as 'desirable' and other input as 'undesirable' . …This distinction gives motivation to animal behavior -actions are performed in order to approach desirable input and avoid undesirable input. It also gives meaning to their perceptions -some perceptions are cues describing favorable situations, others are warnings describing unfavorable ones which must be avoided. (Cisek, 1999, p. 134) The second proposal is that there is a hierarchy of meaning systems which is both evolutionary and epigenetic: each preceding level is presupposed by and integrated in the one that follows, both in evolution and in human ontogenetic development. While for plants and lower animals the meaningful life-world is physical, for certain animals capable of cultural traditions such as chimpanzees (Whiten et al., 1999) , and especially for human beings it also consists of social relations, practices and norms. Since what is central to these latter categories is that they are based on shared, (implicitly) agreed-upon meaning, I will most often refer to them collectively with the term conventions (Lewis, 1969; Clark, 1996) . The value, and therefore the meaning, of such cultural categories interacts with, but is not 'grounded' in (or even less determined by) the essentially life-supporting value of the categories of the lower levels. Maximally condensed, the ensuing definition of meaning is the following:
Meaning (M) is the relation between an organism (O) and its physical and cultural environment (E), determined by the value (V) of E for O.
M = V (O, E)
As mentioned above, similar ideas have already been proposed. The problem, however, is that they have been developed in fields that are fairly isolated from one another. The biological-ecological theme has been developed in, e.g., von Uexküll's (1982) notion of Umwelt, Gibson's (1979) ecological psychology and particularly his notion of 'affordances' , Edelman's (1989 Edelman's ( , 1992 evolutionary theory of consciousness and his emphasis of the role of a biological value system for categorization and memory, as well as in Damasio's (1994) account of the central role of emotions for cognition and consciousness. On the other hand, the social-semiotic perspective has found expression in e.g. Whorf 's (1956) thesis of 'linguistic relativity' , Vygotsky's (1978) 'genetic' psychology and Halliday's (1975) systemic-functional linguistics -all emphasizing the centrality of semiotic mediation for cognition (Mertz, Parmentier and Parmentier, 1997) . There have been authors who have endeavored to bridge the bio-cultural divide in a balanced non-reductionist manner, e.g. Sinha (1988 Sinha ( , 2002 , Donald (1991 Donald ( , 2001 , Nelson (1996) , Deacon (1997) and Tomasello (1999) , but they constitute a minority. I will refer frequently to ideas and concepts originating from these sources, which have been inspirational, but have by no means resolved all the issues.
The structure of the article is as follows: In Section 2, I state and explain six theses which define the proposed meaning-as-value theory in most general terms. For current purposes, a division is made between four types of meaning systems on the basis of (a) the character of the internal value system, (b) structures of categorization, (c) structures of communication and (d) the levelspecific type of learning mechanisms involved. The general idea is that these four meaning systems go into one another like Russian dolls, both in evolution and in ontogenesis -retaining most of their characteristics, but also adapting, while integrating within the system subsuming them. The theory implies a close connection between meaning and emotion and thus has implications for a theory of consciousness. This, however, is a topic that is clearly beyond the scope of the present article. It suffices perhaps to say that the meaning theory here proposed is in broad lines consistent with non-reductive, biocultural approaches to human consciousness such as those of Searle (1999) and Donald (2001) .
Section 3 and 4 apply the proposed theory to human phylogeny and ontogeny respectively. This is done in a general, overarching manner, since the aim is not comprehensiveness, but a framework to help understand both the continuity and the discontinuity between different species and developmental stages in terms of transitions between different meaning-as-value systems. Section 5 addresses briefly the possibility of creating artificial systems capable of meaning from the perspective of the proposed theory, and finally, Section 6 summarizes the major theoretical implications from the investigation.
A final caveat before I proceed: Since my project is integrative and constructive, I will not be in a position to argue in detail for some statements that may be quite controversial. It is also possible that some of the empirical claims are not consistent with the most recent results on e.g. animal communication, but if so they are not necessarily false, since our empirical knowledge on the matter of mind and meaning is very much in flux. Still, there are bound to be mistakes and simplifications, since I venture into fields in which I am by no means "master" and lack "first-hand" knowledge, and should according to the noblesse oblige principle referred to by Schrödinger in the opening paragraph of What is Life? serving as a motto to this article, not write on these matters at all. My apology lies in the perceived necessity of a quest for coherence, and I can state with the eminent physicist that "I can see no other escape … than that some of us should venture to embark on a synthesis of facts and theories, albeit with second-hand and incomplete knowledge of some of them -and at the risk of making fools of ourselves." (Schrödinger, 1992 (Schrödinger, [1944 , p. 1).
Six theses of a unified theory of meaning
In this section I will be maximally schematic and attempt to define the proposed theory in terms of six theses, followed by brief explanations. I will provide little evidence and few references for the claims made, but the following sections will (hopefully) provide some flesh to the skeleton of a theory here outlined. Thesis 1. Meaning is the relationship between an organism and its environment, determined by the value which particular environmental aspects (falling into categories) hold for that organism.
Meaning is an ecological concept in the sense that it is not purely subjective ("in the head") and not objective ("in the world"), but characterizes the interaction between organism and environment. The term 'organism' is chosen with care: only a living system will be capable of meaning, since only living systems have intrinsic (innate or acquired) values.
3 The organism's environment can be only physical, as is the case with simple living beings, or both physical and cultural, as is the case with cultural animals and above all human beings. An example of a meaningful physical aspect is sunlight; an example of a meaningful cultural aspect is a handshake. The meaning of the second is conventional (though not completely arbitrary), while the first is not, but in both cases an aspect of the environment has meaning for the organism to the extent that it has value for this organism. Value can range along degrees of positive or degrees of negative, and thus the aspect will be positively or negatively meaningful. If the aspect has no value at all for the organism, it will be meaningless. Aspects with equivalent value across different contexts form categories and therefore value is central for categorization (Edelman, 1992) .
Thesis 2. The meaning of physical aspects (categories), perceived via innate value systems, is based on their role for the preservation of the life of the individual and its kin.
For organisms with only a physical environment, aspects will have high positive or negative value (and thus be meaningful) or be neutral (and thus be meaningless) depending on whether they play any role for the organism's self-preservation and reproduction. Thus the primary form of 'good' , 'bad' and 'neutral' is organism-relative and species-relative. By selecting for life-forms which are viable in relation to their niches evolution provides organisms with innate value systems, which play a crucial role in sensing the (ecological) value of the environment. A value system can be conceived of as a system of preferences of different degrees of specificity and strength that controls the behavior and learning of the individual (Thesis 4) and is intimately connected to emotion (Thesis 5).
Thesis 3. The meaning of cultural aspects (categories) is evaluated on the basis of conventional value systems consisting (predominantly) of signs. These need to be acquired before they can determine the meaning relation for the organism.
For beings living in complex societies who are capable of cultural learning, the environment is not simply physical, but physical-cum-cultural. This involves not only the products of material culture, but also various socio-cultural practices: rituals, rules and norms. Such cultural categories involve the ability to use and interpret conventional signs, in the semiotic sense of the word, where a relatively concrete expression (e.g. a handshake, a gesture, a word) represents a relatively less concrete concept (e.g. friendship) for the members of a community. Unlike with the meaning of physical aspects (Thesis 2), the meaning of cultural categories is not directly connected to survival, but to the maintenance of social cohesion and communication. While social in origin, this meaning system becomes internalized through acquisition, and assumes the role of an acquired value system, mediating between organism and the environment, i.e. as a form of 'semiotic mediation' . 4 The biologically determined, innate value systems are still present, but are less determinative of meaning than when they operate alone. Furthermore, they appear to be evolutionarily adapted for rewarding forms of social interaction such as imitation which support the development of conventions.
Thesis 4. Both innate and acquired value systems serve as control systems by directing and evaluating the organism's behavior and its adaptation.
On the one hand, internal value systems signal to the organism that some action needs to be taken. Thus they give rise to motivation and various degrees of intentionality, in the sense of goal-directedness. On the other hand, they participate in the evaluation of the actions by assigning (degrees of) 'reward' or 'punishment' , and in this way influencing more adequate future behavior, i.e. learning (in those beings capable of this). This applies both to the innate value systems (Thesis 2) and to those acquired by internalizing cultural conventions (Thesis 3), the latter functioning as norms of various kinds (moral, linguistic etc.) defining 'right' and 'wrong' . This is the basis for self-correction and self-regulation.
Thesis 5. Intrinsic value, and consequently meaning, is intimately connected to emotion and feeling and represents a necessary, but not sufficient condition for phenomenal experience.
The intrinsic value systems, innate or acquired, interact tightly with the emotional system, so that in beings capable of (primary) consciousness negative value is experienced as negative emotions, with pain as prototype and positive value as positive emotions, with pleasure as prototype. Emotions play a central role in learning, but since it is possible to have simple meaning systems without learning, where the (projected) value is completely defined by the innate value system, it is also possible to have meaning systems without emotions. If we also distinguish between emotion and feeling, the latter necessarily involving awareness, while the first does not, in the sense of Damasio (1994) , it is also possible to have meaning systems capable of learning and 'emotion' but without phenomenal experience. 5 Hence, meaning constitutes a necessary but not sufficient condition for consciousness.
Thesis 6. On the basis of the concepts introduced in Theses 1-5, four different types of meaning systems can be defined, forming an evolutionary and epigenetic hierarchy.
The names given to the four types of meaning systems, based on their levelspecific category of perception/social interaction are cue-based, associational, mimetic and symbolic. The first two types correspond to systems of 'natural' meaning, while the last one is a system of 'non-natural' , conventional meaning (Grice, 1957) ; the third one based on mimesis is transitional. The four types form an evolutionary hierarchy in the sense that each succeeding type in the hierarchy builds upon, and 'encapsulates' the preceding ones, in a manner similar to that suggested by Donald (1991) . Since the epigenetic nature of ontogeny implies a parallelism with phylogeny, the hierarchy should apply to human ontogenetic development as well. Table 1 presents the major defining characteristics of these four types of meaning systems.
3. The phylogeny of meaning The present and the following section will concretize the theory outlined above by applying it to phylogeny and human ontogeny, respectively. Beginning with phylogeny, there are at least two fundamental ways in which evolution resembles the hierarchy presented in Table 1 . First, the relation between the different meaning systems is incremental, i.e. each "higher" system builds upon the one preceding it. The second is that while each transition is in a sense qualitative, it is at least conceivable how a higher type can emerge from a lower, i.e. there is no fundamental discontinuity involved.
At the same time, the presented hierarchy is quite schematic and therefore should not be expected to correspond precisely to specific boundaries in the biological hierarchy, defined in terms of phyla, classes, orders, families, genera and species. In this sense it is similar to a popular evolutionary classification proposed by Dennett (1996) , which also happens to consist of four major types: 'Darwinian' , 'Skinnerian' , 'Popperian' and 'Gregorian' creatures. The two hierarchies, however, use rather different criteria to differentiate between the levels. In Dennett's case the different types have above all different representational abilities, while in the present account, the crucial characteristic of each type is the nature of the intrinsic value system, determining the organism's meaning-relevant relationship with the environment. Another difference is that Dennett's hierarchy presents "higher" creatures extensionally, e.g. a Skinnerian creature is also a Darwinian creature, but not vice versa. In the present account, an associational meaning system includes also a cue-based system in accordance the Russian Dolls metaphor suggested above, but the result is not a simple concatenation, since the simpler system undergoes adaptations when embedded in the more complex one. So, for example, a 'mimetic creature' is not also an 'associational creature' , since while it has inherited the meaning system of the latter, it has subordinated it under a 'mimetic controller' (Donald, 1991 (Donald, , 2001 ).
Cue-based creatures
The first problem for any evolutionary model is that it requires a starting point, while at the same time it is always possible to argue that the organization at this point is itself in need of an evolutionary explanation. Arguably, the clearest starting point is life itself. Living creatures are traditionally classified into 5 'kingdoms': Monera (e.g. bacteria), Protista (single-celled organisms), Plantae (plants), Fungi (e.g. yeast) and Animalia (animals). The first 4 of these and the simpler animals, e.g. those with no central nervous system (e.g. flatworms) can be regarded as creatures having an Umwelt of cue-based meaning: They perceive the environment in terms of fixed, pre-determined set of cues, and in this sense are similar to the famous tick of von Uexküll (1982 Uexküll ( [1940 ). To the extent that we can talk of 'communication' between such organisms at all, it is done through pre-determined signals that are treated by other similar organisms in the same way as other environmental cues.
Notice that on the present account, and unlike that of von Uexküll (Ziemke and Sharkey, 2001; Emmeche, 2001) , the presence of meaning does not imply that such organisms have phenomenal (qualitative) experience. In the simplest of these organisms there is no learning in the individual creature, but only in the species as a whole, implemented through natural selection, i.e. they constitute what Dennett (1996) refers to as 'Darwinian creatures' . However, we may also include in the class of cue-based meaning creatures those which possess a simple learning mechanism based on habituation, such as the sea snail Aplysia, which learns to ignore often-repeated stimuli of low and medium intensity, but quickly becomes 'sensitized' if presented with a strong stimulus such as an electric shock. The point is that this kind of simple learning is not controlled by the organism's value system involved in evaluating an undertaken action positively or negatively on the basis of its consequences. If such evaluation is the primary function of emotions, as argued by e.g. Rolls (1999) , it can be concluded that cue-based creatures lack emotional experience. Furthermore, if emotional experience is the primary form of consciousness, then cue-based creatures should lack any kind of phenomenal experience, and thus resemble Descartes' 'automata' . If these conjectures are correct, then it can be concluded that meaning is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for consciousness. (Thesis 5, Section 2)
One may perhaps wonder why consider such "lowly" creatures as bacteria and plants as being capable of meaning at all. The answer follows directly from the definition of meaning argued for in this article: they can be seen as possessing value systems in the form of homeostatic mechanisms which orient them towards the environment, and thus help them to preserve and propagate their organization, i.e. life. The relevant environmental aspects, e.g. the chemicals consumed by bacteria and the solar energy required by plants, are meaningful for these organisms in a very literal sense. The value systems of these creatures do not seem to contribute to learning, but they motivate them to 'seek out' such substances and to 'avoid' those that are harmful. This can be seen as the most primordial kind of intentionality, i.e. goal-directedness, built into the fabric of life itself. This last point is important because it implies continuity in the development of intentionality along the steps of the Scala Naturae, and absolves us of the problem of having to account for its sudden 'emergence' on some particular level of evolution.
Associational creatures
The second category of the hierarchy includes a rather heterogeneous set of animals including reptiles, birds and most mammals, though excluding apes, and possibly cetaceans (whales and dolphins). This group no doubt should be further divided into sub-groups on the basis of substantial neural and cognitive differences, and possibly even the absence/possession of 'primary consciousness' -a unified experience of the here-and-now (Edelman, 1989 (Edelman, , 1992 -but for present purposes will be treated as a whole due to the shared characteristics described below.
The innate value system of these creatures not only motivates them to act in particular ways, but also evaluates their actions and thus allows them to learn by forming associations between environmental aspects and the animal's actions: stimulus-stimulus (S-S), stimulus-response (S-R) and responsestimulus (R-S) (Macphail, 1998) . Combinations of such associations can be exceedingly complex and can be said to correspond to the psychological notion of 'schemas' (Bartlett, 1932) . The S-R-S¢ chain (Tolman, 1932) is roughly equivalent to Piaget's notion of 'scheme' as consisting of the triad ContextAction -Expected-result (von Glasersfeld, 1997) . In both of these triads the third element introduces a teleological form of causality: an action can be performed for the sake of obtaining a certain goal. The ability to form such goals, implicit in the simpler associational creatures, explicit in the more complex ones, represents an obvious development of the organism's intentionality, compared to the primitive form in cue-based systems. It has important implications for learning, since actions can be evaluated and adjusted on the basis of their satisfaction of specific, short-term goals, rather than general homeostatic requirements.
Communication between associational creatures is done through signals, which at least in the higher forms of the group are partially learned, rather than innate. This may involve either the signal itself as is the case with bird song or its appropriate contextual usage, as in vervet monkey alarm calls. In neurobiological terms, such animals have a central nervous system, and in birds and mammals a limbic system and neocortex. The limbic system, especially amygdala and hippocampus, has been interpreted as representing the bodily state of the organism and claimed to play a crucial part in the formation of 'primary emotions' , which are "hard-wired", integrated reactions of the whole body to value-laden physical and social stimuli (Damasio, 1994) . It is still unclear to what extent they are also experienced by an associational creature, and thus represent a form of 'feeling-consciousness ' (MacPhail, 1998) , but there are no a priori reasons to exclude this either.
On the other hand, most animals have strong limits on what they are capable of learning: Pigeons associate sight with food, but not odor or sound with food; rats can associate size with shock, but not taste with shock etc. These restrictions make good ecological sense, and show species-specific particularities of the innate value systems (Badcock, 2000) . Furthermore, such creatures do not show population-specific characteristics, i.e. no 'culture' in the sense of tradition. They can not learn through imitation, and despite occasional claims to the contrary, possess no ability to learn anything resembling human language.
It is possible to find a common denominator to such limitations: associational creatures are not able to understand other creatures as having mental states. Consequently, they are not capable of acquiring conventional signs, since this implies the possession of shared meanings, and hence 'intersubjectivity' . On its part, this latter concept hardly makes sense without at least a basic understanding of mental states, i.e. a 'theory of mind' (Premack and Woodruff, 1978) , which is not a monolithic concept, but can be divided in 'levels' corresponding to stages in phylogenetic and ontogenetic development (Tomasello, 1999; Gärdenfors, 2001) . The ability to develop systems of shared meanings can also be seen as dependent on what Damasio (1994) calls 'secondary emotions' , "which occur once we begin experiencing feelings and forming systematic connections between categories of objects and situations, on the one hand, and primary emotions, on the other" (ibid., p. 134, original emphasis). It seems reasonable to claim that without an understanding of intentionality and secondary emotions it would not be possible for an organism to learn cultural categories, which owe their meaning not to their usefulness for the organism directly, but to the value they are attributed by other members of the group.
While these capacities have not been convincingly demonstrated in other animals than (non-human and human) primates, (and even there they are still contested, see below) at least two very different species have been argued at least to approach a higher meaning level than here suggested: domesticated dogs (Canis familiaris), (Cooper et. al, 2003) and grey parrots (Psittacus erthacus), (Pepperberg, 2001 (Pepperberg, , 2002 . Characteristically, both are highly social animals, adapted for leaning and utilizing 'social cues' . But the latter are a form of signal, whose meaning is based on statistical regularities of behavior (e.g. a person with a book is less likely to point to food than a person without a book), rather than signs based on conventions and the interpretation of intentions, and the available evidence does not compel us to infer the latter, especially if we adopt the most parsimonious explanation.
Mimetic creatures
The simplest kind of shared, cultural meanings have been argued to have their basis in mimesis: whole body imitation used for representational means (Donald 1991 (Donald , 2001 Zlatev 2001a Zlatev , 2002 ). This ability is possibly supported by a 'mirror neuron system' , initially used for action recognition, but with evolution coopted for imitation and gestural communication (Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998) . Evidence from relatively wide cultural variation (Whiten et al. 1999; Whiten et al. 2001; Whiten, Horner and Marshall-Pescini 2003; Boesch 2003) , the ability to imitate complex skills (Whiten, 1998 (Whiten, , 2002 , and arbitrary actions, apparently self-consciously (Custance, Whiten and Bard, 1995) that has accumulated recently, strongly suggests that apes have a more developed mimetic capacity than originally assumed by e.g. Donald. Some of the evidence also involves (enculturated) dolphins (Herman, 2002) .
The ability to use true imitation learning, as opposed to mimicry, requires the ability to imagine another's point of view, or in other words, at least a basic form of a 'theory of mind' . Despite original skepticism (e.g. Tomasello, 1999) , the more recent evidence has convinced most that at least chimpanzees, the most widely studied non-human primate species, possess at least a rudimentary form of this (Tomasello, Call and Hare, in press ), though the methodological debate continues (Povinelli and Vonk, in press ).
The question, however, arises: If apes indeed possess mimetic capacity, why have they not been shown to use it spontaneously for communication, i.e. to create mimetic signs in order to communicate their intentions? While there is no evidence for this "in the wild", a cursory review of the literature on "iconic gestural communication in non-human primates" (Persson, manuscript) shows that there is indeed support for mimetic invention and interpretation in captive and 'enculturated' apes. The first concerns the gorillas of the San Francisco zoo, where the younger members and especially the male Kubie seemed to use iconic signs to communicate his intentions. While conceivably formed through 'ontogenetic ritualization' , i.e. without understanding the sign relationship, they were used successfully with other members than those with whom they emerged, suggesting the ability to interpret them as signs rather than signals (Tanner and Byrne, 1999) . A second example comes from gorillas Koko and Michael, who were taught American Sign Language, but who simultaneously invented some new signs, largely based on iconicity (Bonvillian and Patterson, 1993) .
In sum, even if there is still controversy concerning the degree to which apes are capable of sign use and imitation in the wild it is clear that at least enculturated apes can imitate even arbitrary gestures and learn to communicate with people, and even among themselves to some degree, through conventionalized signs, most often based on iconic gestures. Such extensive learning and reasoning capacities in the social and personal domain would require the ability to entertain secondary emotions toward sociocultural categories and situations. This ability has been shown to be supported by the prefrontal cortex, and not just by the limbic system (Damasio, 1994) . The proposal made here is that once acquired, the system of social conventions takes on the role of an extended value system, supplementing the innate value system in evaluating physical and social events and thus having a strong influence on future learning and behavior. While such semiotic mediation blossoms fully in human beings, the evidence briefly reviewed in this section suggests that it is not completely beyond the capacities of apes.
Given that the human and chimpanzee lineages have shared an ancestor some 6 million years ago, it is quite probable that australopithecines from about 4 million and especially Homo erectus from 1.5 million years ago which colonized the world, leaving numerous traces of material culture had even more developed mimetic skills than the apes of today, as proposed by Donald (1991) . On the other hand their ability to use symbolic meaning systems such as language was probably limited. We can see such limitations clearly in apes, where the problem seems to be not so much arbitrariness per se, but the systematic relations between the symbols, and their independence from the presence of their referents (Deacon, 1997) , which are prerequisites for developing a fully conventional sign system, i.e. a symbolic one. 6 Despite a number of recent successes, above all the bonobo Kanzi (SavageRumbaugh and Rumbaugh, 1993; Savage-Rumbaugh, Shanker and Taylor, 1998) the ability of apes to acquire human language remains contestable. The challenges are not just a matter of leaning "complex syntax", where the debate has most often focused, but also semantically. Above all, ape production of language in spontaneous environments is largely limited to the instrumental ('I want') and regulatory ('do this') functions, while utterances that can be classed as instances of interpersonal ('me and you'), heuristic ('what is this?') and informative ('let me tell you something you don't know') functions (Halliday, 1975) have not been clearly demonstrated. What apes also seem to lack is the ability to use conventional signs not only for communication but for selfcommunication, i.e. reflection.
7 They also lack cultural histories: the interpopulation variation mentioned above is substantial but has not lead to cumulative cultural evolution (Tomasello, 1999; Whiten, Horner & MarshallPescini 2003) .
Symbolic creatures
Language, reflection, cultural variation: these are all defining characteristics of Homo sapiens, also called "homo symbolicus" by Deacon (1997) because of our innate superiority in 'symbolic reference' , which is more conventional and systematic than communication based on mimesis (Section 4.4 below for an explication). According to Deacon, the acquisition of symbolic systems appears to rely on a strongly expanded prefrontal cortex giving our species an important edge in working memory, inhibition of involuntary reactions and control of attention. At the same time, with its connections to the limbic system and the somatosensory cortexes, the prefrontal cortex has also been shown to be crucial for the formation of the culturally modulated secondary emotions, (Damasio, 1994) as pointed out above. Putting these two findings together leads to an understanding of language not as a syntactic (or even semantic) "calculus" but as a conventional symbolic system laden with cultural value. This agrees well with its central role in the creation of higher-order meaning-as-value systems such as ideologies and religions. As well-known, such higher-order values can introduce a detachment from the more basic life-supporting value system inherited from our predecessors. This can be seen as a form of freedom from biological determinism, as in Buddhist philosophy, e.g.:
It is necessary to have a mind which is beyond having a self, or anything belonging to a self, a mind which is even beyond the ideas of good and bad, merit and demerit, pleasure and pain. …Dependent Origination teaches us to be careful whenever there is contact between the senses and their objects. Feeling must not be allowed to brew up or give rise to craving. (Buddhadasa Bhikku, 1992, p. 7-8) But it is doubtful if such a state of mind is possible without causing detrimental effects for physical (and mental) integrity in anything but very special cultural environments such as monasteries. Furthermore, instead of independence, the "power of the word" can generate an even deeper dependence on beliefs, ideas etc. as warned by Zen Buddhists. This can even be life-destructive, as demonstrated most graphically by suicide sects. Somewhat paradoxically then, symbolic language can be either advantageous for reasoning by providing a powerful combinatory system of expressing and 'manipulating' social meanings internally and thus enhancing reflection and self-consciousness, or disadvantageous by "short-circuiting" the evolutionary derived loop of evaluating situations on the basis of their 'somatic' , i.e. bodily, value. This double role of language can be conceptualized by assuming that it plays a central part in a simulated 'as-if loop' in feeling and reasoning in which "the body is bypassed". As Damasio (1994) argues, dissociating symbolic reasoning from 'somatic markers' is pathological, and in the long run self-destructive.
Somewhat more down to earth, the 'thesis of linguistic relativity' , often associated with the name and work of Whorf (1956) , has during recent years found empirical confirmation, albeit in a weaker form than originally presented, in cognitive-semantic domains such as object categorization (Lucy, 1992) , spatial orientation (Pedersen, 1995; Levinson, 2003) and abstract concepts like time, based on metaphorical projections (Boroditsky, 2001). While not demonstrating a determining role of language, such results are certainly consistent with the role of semiotic mediation for shaping human cognition argued for in the article. Table 2 presents a summary of the evolutionary hierarchy presented in this section, along with some of the characteristics and limitations of each meaning system.
The ontogeny of meaning
The existence of similarities between phylogenetic and ontogenetic development has been observed at least since Haeckel (1874) stated the famous "biological law" of recapitulation. At the same time the notion is often criticized for being aprioristic: why should the individual develop along a trajectory that is similar to that of the species, given that the temporal spans, the driving forces and the contexts of the two processes are so different? (Sinha, 2002) While these are valid objections, I claim here as in earlier work that there is indeed a very good reason for what in broad lines can be described as a 'recapitulation' of phylogeny: the epigenetic nature of ontogeny (Piaget, 1971; Sinha, 1988 Sinha, , 2002 Müller, 1996; Zlatev, 1997 Zlatev, , 2001a . This characterization implies that ontogeny proceeds through an ordered succession of stages that are guided, but not determined by the genes, where "higher" stages require more time and experience than the "lower" ones. Since evolutionarily more ancient cognitive structures require less experience in order to mature than evolutionarily modern structures, the early stages of ontogeny will be dominated by evolutionarily more ancient mechanisms and the later stages by more modern mechanisms. Donald (2001) provides the following example of an ancient mechanism, which continues to exist in modern human beings in the form of a 'vestige':
One of the best-known examples of a neural vestige in humans is the propriospinal tract, one of the spinal cord pathways that connects the brain to the hand. We have inherited this primitive hand-control pathway from a very ancient ancestor. It conveys messages from the motor brain to all the fingers of the hand at once, allowing only diffuse contraction of all these fingers together. …Apes inherited this tract from distant monkey ancestors, but they (and we) are capable of much finer hand control because apes evolved a second spinal cord path for finer control, via the pyramidal tract. …In humans the propriospinal The "usefulness" of a more ancient neural/cognitive structure may in some cases be even greater, namely to serve the role of a "stepping stone" in the acquisition of the more recent structure, this role varying from one of facilitation to one of being a necessary prerequisite. In particular, there are good reasons to believe that a basic mechanism such as association learning constitutes a prerequisite for acquiring mimetic skill, while the latter is a prerequisite for the acquisition of language and other symbol systems (Donald 1991 (Donald , 2001 Zlatev 2002) . If this argument is accepted, at least in general lines, it follows that it should be possible to find more concrete ontogenetic evidence to support the hierarchy of phylogenetic stages presented in the previous section. It will be the goal of the present section to review some of the developmental evidence concerning social interaction in children (neglecting physical interaction for the sake of brevity) in order to see if there is indeed a fairly close parallelism between phylogeny and ontogeny as predicted by epigenesis.
Cue-based stage?
Is there any basis for supposing that human ontogeny undergoes a stage dominated by cue-based meaning? Given the simplicity of cue-based creatures this proposal may even seem preposterous. Furthermore, as is now well-known, new-born infants are far from the hapless receivers of "booming, buzzing" sensations envisioned by William James, or the naïve "constructors of reality", bootstrapped in their efforts by only a few innate action schemas, as claimed by Piaget. Rather, it has been convincingly shown that we are born not only with sense and motor organs, but also with at least some elementary skills for using them in perception (Bower, 1973) , motor activity (von Holsten, 1983 ) and imitation (Meltzoff and Moore, 1977) . The fact that new-born children show signs of recognizing their mother tongue and even television jingles (Hepper, 1991) demonstrates that these skills are not fixed by evolution, but rather that there is a degree of learning that occurs before birth.
On the other hand, even if pre-natal learning goes beyond simple habituation, it is not clear if it is controlled by the value system, which can be expected to be evolutionarily adapted for the environment outside the womb. Furthermore, it is not too hard to see at least "vestiges" of cue-based meaning, playing a central role in the life of the new-born. The sucking reflex is the most obvious example of a life-supporting, cue-based action. The child's first expressions of strongly emotional social interaction -the cry and the smile -also function basically as cues: innate expressions of negative, respectively positive somatic states. Emotional reactions, present in fetuses from the 7th month of gestation, constitute an important difference compared to the supposedly 'emotionless' cue-based creatures. On the other hand, while it is impossible to deny that they are accompanied by phenomenal, subjective experience, i.e. 'feelings' , one can still wonder to what extent this applies to 'unborn children' .
There is no doubt that the mouth-opening and tongue-protrusion copying gestures that the newborn is capable of are indeed complex skills -which are still beyond the capacity of robotics, despite the fact that 'imitation' has been a hot topic for some time in that field (Schall, 1999; Dautenhahn and Nehaniv, 2002) . But is it really justified to describe them as acts of imitation, as done by e.g. Meltzoff and Moore (1995) given the limited and stereotypical character of these gestures, and the fact that they seem to temporally "disappear" 3 weeks after birth, and to appear again a few months later? Arguably, this term is better reserved for the modeling of goal-directed behavior which requires an understanding of the model's intentionality, and this is clearly beyond the competence of neonates (Tomasello, 1999) . A more parsimonious interpretation is that these actions are triggered by social stimuli that are quite complex, but that they nevertheless derive from a level of cue-based meaning. Such 'gesture-copying' is possibly based on the innate mirror neuron system, postulated by Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) . Since their value is not in supporting life directly, but through social interaction and bonding, it is likely that they reflect an adaptation of the human innate value system that is to play a role in the acquisition of secondary, social value later in development.
In sum, even if there is no clear correspondence between phylogeny and ontogeny with respect to cue-based meaning, the possible lack of value-based learning (and association formation) in the womb and the presence of cuebased vestiges in the behavior of the new-born suggest some similarity in human pre-natal development and cue-based creatures. The crucial difference, of course, is that for complex animals such as ourselves, this constitutes at most a 'preparatory stage' (Zlatev 2001a) , opening the door to rapid cognitive development after birth.
Associational stage (0-9 months)
The child's cognitive development during the first 9 months of life is enormous, but with a sufficiently broad notion of 'association' as that proposed in Section 3.2, it is possible to see this period as being dominated by associational meaning. This means that during this stage the child's development is mainly determined by a process of evaluating its own perceptions and actions through the innate value system, and in this way "constructing" sensory-motor schemas consisting of association chains, serving as the basis for interacting with objects and people (Piaget 1953; Tomasello 1999; Zlatev 2001a) . It has, for example, been shown that as early as 2 months old, the human infant is capable of engaging in 'protoconversations' (Trevarthen, 1992) which demonstrate both structural (e.g. turn-taking) and emotional aspects of communication:
The baby can turn affective contact on and off by fixating the mother's eyes, then looking away briefly to make an utterance, or more definitely when tired or distressed. …Infant and adult evidently meet with matching standards of emotion and emotional change that define "good" or "bad" expression and reply. (Trevarthen 1992, 107, my emphasis) These "matching standards", however, are still performed mostly on the child's own terms since they are based on the innate value system and not on learned criteria. Unsurprisingly, 'motherese' (or rather 'caretaker talk' , since the phenomenon applies to both sexes) shows universal, culture-independent characteristics indicating that what (responsive) caretakers are doing is tuning in to these innate criteria. However, the role of learned patterns of interaction soon increases. By 3 months children engage in interactive games such as Peekaboo, with more or less stable "rules" -or rather contingencies, since the 3-month old child is not yet capable of grasping that one should play a game in a particular way, i.e. the concept of normativity, which is implied in true rulefollowing (Itkonen, 1983) .
By 6 months children start to initiate acts of communication themselves. Also by that time they start forming 'proto-gestures' such as raising their arms when wanting to be picked up. It is possible to see such acts as the birth of intentional communication and conventionality. A more conservative interpretation, however, is that these are 'ontogenetic ritualizations' of patterns of interaction, i.e. schemas (sequences of associations) learned from experience, motivated and learned by desires and emotions, but not yet requiring an understanding of either the intentionality of the other, or of oneself. Such an interpretation is more economic, and is therefore to be preferred, everything else being equal.
In sum, communication during the first 9 months of human life consists of signals, whose meaning is based either more or less directly on the innate value system, or acquired through ontogenetic ritualization based on association learning. The 'content' of these signals concerns almost exclusively desires and emotions, and their two-way communication, especially with responsive others such as parents, can lead to shared states of mind that have been interpreted by some child psychologists as a form of 'primary intersubjectivity' (Trevarthen, 1992) , sometimes even claimed to be innate in the form of a 'virtual other' (Bråten, 1992) . Such interpretations, especially those concerning innateness, can be disputed (Tomasello, 1999; Zlatev, 2002) . From a minimalist standpoint, the evidence can be accounted for by assuming a partially innate mechanism for 'interaffectivity' dominating social interaction during this stage, while true intersubjectivity can be seen to emerge later with the understanding of intentionality and selfhood, as described below.
Mimetic stage (9-24 months)
Understanding that other people have intentions towards objects and third parties should be expected to give rise to qualitative changes in a whole set of the child's behaviors. Such changes do indeed occur, heralding what Tomasello (1995 Tomasello ( , 1999 refers to as a "socio-cognitive revolution": At about 9 months of age, infants begin to behave in a number of ways that demonstrate their growing awareness of how other persons work as psychological beings. They look where adults are looking (joint attention), they look to see how adults are feeling toward a novel person or object (social referencing), and they do what adults are doing with a novel object (imitation learning). … Infants also at this time first direct intentional communicative gestures to adults, indicating an expectation that adults are causal agents who can make things happen. All of these behaviors indicate a kind of social-cognitive revolution: At 9 months of age infants begin to understand that other people perceive the world and have intentions and feelings towards it; they begin to understand them as intentional agents. (Tomasello, 1995, p. 175) Other researchers have independently argued for a cognitive reorganization around the same time period, including scholars who otherwise emphasize developmental continuity: Both Trevarthen (1992) , who attributes the changes in the child's cognition to the emergence of 'secondary intersubjectivity ' and Halliday (1975) , who emphasizes the rise of 'protolanguage' , pinpoint these developments to approximately the age of 9 months. A common theme to these different notions is that they all presuppose that after the transition, the child is capable of sharing attention in a reflexive way, i.e. not just to attend where the other is attending, but to be aware of this fact, and in relation to this -to understand that another person's attention, and eventually intentions, can be influenced through communication. This means that communication can not any more consist (only) of signals which influence the other's behavior nonmediationally but must (eventually) rise to the level of conventional signs, which operate by having a shared 'expression' and a shared 'content' (Sinha, 2002) . The best-known sign system is of course language, but at this stage children are not yet capable of acquiring it. How do they then make the transition from signals to signs? There is evidence that the "missing link" between signals and language is filled, as in evolution, by mimesis (Zlatev, 2001a (Zlatev, , 2002 . Of particular importance are three mimetic skills: imitation, pointing and representational gesture.
While both the gesture copying and the ritualization of the previous period can be seen as forerunners of imitation, Tomasello (1999) is correct to point out the novelty of 'cultural learning' , in which an action is seen "through the eyes" of another. This implies that the child can differentiate between the method, e.g. dragging a rake, and the goal, e.g. obtaining a desired object. Children have also been shown to prefer the method used by the model adult even if it was not the most efficient one, while apes in similar conditions opted for the more efficient method. Consequently, the differentiation between method and goal and the conventionalization of the former, observed in the cultural learning of pragmatic actions, can be said to anticipate these properties in the subsequent use of signs.
The transition from signal to sign can also be perceived within a single communicative action: pointing (Bates, 1976) . Initially, children are observed to engage only in 'imperative pointing' , where the goal is always pragmatic, e.g. to get a desired toy, and the adult to whom the gesture is directed is simply a means for achieving this goal. Nothing more than ritualization, i.e. association learning, is required in order to explain this. However, soon after the 9-month revolution, children start to point 'declaratively' , 8 e.g. at the moon or an airplane, where the communicative goal is to attend to an object jointly, i.e. to refer (Bruner 1983; Brinck, forthcoming) . The manner of pointing changes too, from more diffuse and "reaching-like" to more conventional, i.e. done with the pointing finger or in whatever other way may be appropriate in the ambient culture. Thus, infant declarative pointing fulfills the conditions not only for being a sign by displaying the semiotic function (Piaget, 1952; Sonesson, 1989 Sonesson, , 1992 , i.e. conditions (a) and (b), but also what might be called a 'protoconventional' sign, condition (c):
a. the child differentiates between expression (= pointing gesture) and content (="look at this"), where b. the first 'stands for' ('represents' , 'means') the second, and c. the knowledge of (b) is shared by the participants in the communication event.
At the same time, it is one of the simplest possible signs, since the referent (not to be confused with the 'content') is constrained to be in spatial proximity with the expression. Furthermore there is only reference ("look at X"), and no predication ("X is Y"). Therefore it is unsurprising that pointing appears to be one of the first signs to be acquired by children across cultures. While referential pointing is a typical indexical sign, other early-acquired signs are those based on iconicity, where the expression resembles the content (Peirce, 1931-35; Sonesson, 1989) . Such gestures are invented spontaneously by deaf (Goldin-Meadow and Feldman, 1977) and hearing children (Acredolo and Goodwyn, 1994) alike in the second year of life. Furthermore, children can be taught iconic gestures, 'baby signs' , from as early as 9 months (Acredolo and Goodwyn, 1996) , showing again that it is around this age that the child can grasp the idea of intentional communication. Since (normal) children's phonetic abilities are quite high at that time, the developmental advantage of iconic gestures over vocal ones as sign expressions must be not in their production, but in the greater transparency of the relationship expression-content.
Of course, the degree to which the potential for learning iconic gestures will be utilized will vary between cultures and contexts. The fact that even blind children are capable of acquiring language, though with some predictable delays and differences (Landau and Gleitman, 1985) , means that the use of visually perceived iconic gestures can not be a necessary precondition for the acquisition of language. Still, even in the context of blindness, mimesis in a general sensethe volitional use of the body (including the vocal tract) for representational means -appears to be crucial in the development of the 'semiotic function' (Piaget, 1952) . Furthermore, along with neural structures such as the (hypothetical) mirror neuron system supporting it, mimesis is a likely basis for the development of (full) intersubjectivity (Zlatev, 2002) . Since the latter is itself a prerequisite for the acquisition of language, which rests on the ability to form shared meanings (Itkonen, 1983; Nelson, 1996) , it should be expected that a (genetic or developmental) disturbance in mimesis would result in abnormal development in a host of behavioral and cognitive spheres: from motoric skills to social interaction and language. Indeed, this is what is observed in autism (Frith, 1989) , and the future study of mimesis could constitute the key to understanding this rather mysterious disorder.
At the same time, mimesis is not all-powerful and has its limitations as a basis for communication. Empirically, the repertoire of mimetic signs the child possesses -even those taught by the methods of Acredolo and Goodwyn (1996) -remains limited to at most a few dozen for a long period of time. The
Hallidayan communicative functions (Section 3.3) that these signs are put to are restricted -though unlike with apes, there are clear indications of noninstrumental use, e.g. 'declarative pointing' . Also, there is no evidence of prelinguistic signs being used in reflection. Conceptually, it can be argued that mimetic signs are not fully conventional in the sense of being not only shared, but known to be shared by the members of the community. Related to this, there is little systematicty in the way mimetic signs are combined and interrelated, i.e. a grammar, and it is hard to imagine how a 'story' can be communicated by such means.
These limitations are quite similar to those of apes (and by analogy to Homo erectus) as discussed earlier. And just as with apes, there are those who argue that the only difference between the semiotic potential of pre-linguistic and linguistic children is quantitative rather than qualitative, or a matter of development in motor skills (Bates, 1979) . There is, however, strong evidence for a "second revolution" in ontogenesis during the second half of the second year, to which we now turn.
Early symbolic stage (2-5 years)
Some time between 18 and 24 months nearly all children undergo a rapid development of productive vocabulary and shortly afterwards, an increased number of multi-morphemic utterances, i.e. the so-called vocabulary and grammar spurts. Soon after, children start developing the ability to understand and construct 'stories' , narratives of (causally) related events, centered around a few protagonists (Berman and Slobin, 1994) . If these developments signal a transition in linguistic (and cognitive) skills, what is it that brings this transition about? Considering that the understanding of intentionality and social sign-use begins earlier, it can hardly be a matter of a 'naming insight' as e.g. suggested by McShane (1979) .
The explanation suggested by the present theory is that it marks the beginning of the acquisition of symbols proper, assuming a definition in which symbols are signs which apart from the properties (a-c), characterizing mimetic signs as pointed out above, possess the additional properties (d-f):
a. the subject differentiates between expression and content, where b. the expression 'stands for' the content; c. the knowledge of (b) is shared by the participants in the communication event, and d. the knowledge of (c) is also shared, i.e. the sign is known to be shared, i.e. fully conventional;
e. symbols form a system based on logical and grammatical relations, and f. the relationship between expression and content can (though need not) be arbitrary.
Such an explanation is compatible with Deacon's (1997) view of the prefrontal cortex as essentially implicated for acquiring a symbolic system, assuming that the growing biological maturation of the prefrontal cortex in the second year of life allows attention to be focused on inter-symbolic relations, and not just on relations between sign-tokens ('expressions') and their referents, which Deacon rather confusingly refers to as 'indexes' (Sonesson, forthcoming) . Such interrelations allow the establishment of abstract concepts, classes and hierarchies, the kinds of structures that symbols are uniquely suited for. The fact that they are constrained in a system would further help fix their meaning and make it fully conventional, i.e. known to be socially shared, i.e. (d). Form this point of view, arbitrariness, i.e. (f) is a secondary, derivative, rather than the most crucial property of symbols, in contrast to the emphasis on this property in the definitions of 'signs' (Saussure, 1916) and 'symbols' (Peirce, 1931-95) by the classics of semiotics. Since the meanings of symbols are not particular referents but concepts, a resemblance relation between signifier and signified is unnecessary and in many cases impossible. Finally, symbols are ordered not just in logical relationships such as 'hyponymy' (e.g. "animal-dog") and 'antonomy' (e.g. "alive-dead"), but in 'syntagmatic' (horizontal) relationships to form sentences, and sentences are themselves ordered in coherence relations to form dialogue and discourse, i.e. (e). Halliday (1975) offers a similar explanation of the transition from protolanguage, which is intentional but not yet conventional and systematic, to grammar-based and dialogic language:
It is as if up to a certain point the child was working his way through the history of the human race creating a language for himself to serve those needs which exist independently of language and which are an essential feature of human life at all times and in all cultures. Then … taking over in one immense stride its two fundamental properties as a system: one, its organization on three levels, with lexicogrammatical level of wording intermediate between the meaning and the sounding, …and two, its ability to function as an independent means of human interaction, as a form of social interaction which generates its own set of roles and role relationships. (ibid., p. 32) Notice that it is not claimed that it is the manual modality that is mimetic and the vocal one that is symbolic. The same kind of qualitative difference between gestural communication and Sign Language has been observed by Morford, Singleton and Goldin-Meadow (1995) within the same modality, and it is noteworthy that these authors offer a similar explanation of the transition from one to the other:
This change, we believe, comes about as a result of the language user attending less to the relationship between the referent and its symbol, and more to the relationship between the symbols that make up the system. Second, there is increasing evidence of a level of arbitrary representation over time and as the size of the community of language users increase. (ibid., p. 325) With the acquisition of symbolic language the child enters not just a new mode of communicating, but a new mode of thinking. This has been shown in at least two groups of studies: those pertaining to the functional role of private, and later on, internal speech (Vygotsky, 1962; Berk, 1994) and those of the social origins of 'autobiographic memory' (Nelson and Hudson, 1993; Nelson, 1996) . Furthermore, the existence of different 'perspectives' reflected in any human language (e.g. the same real-world object can be described as "Fido", "collie", "dog", "animal", "man's best friend" etc.) is probably instrumental to the ability to rapidly switch between different points-of-view, and eventually to develop a more explicit 'theory of mind' (Astington and Jenkins, 1999) . Such developments in meta-cognitive (i.e. reflective) ability, plausibly brought about through an increased mastery of symbolic language, could be said to mark the end of the "early" phase of the symbolic stage around the age of 5 years, with variation due to socio-economic and cultural factors (Berk, 1994; Tomasello, 1999) .
Given these radical departures from animal cognition, it seems correct to pinpoint the entry into symbolic language as the main "cognitive revolution" in ontogenesis (Vygotsky, 1962; Sinha, 1988 Sinha, , 2002 even though there are important milestones both preceding and following it. At the same time, language can not be the major cause of (self-)consciousness as claimed by numerous contemporary theorists (e.g. Dennett, 1991; MacPhial, 1998) , since its acquisition presupposes at least a degree of intersubjectivity -which logically presupposes subjectivity (i.e. phenomenal experience itself) -and empirically presupposes mimesis, as previously argued.
Summary
Human ontogeny is a fascinating and tremendously complex phenomenon, and it is clear that the presentation in this section was unduly schematic, neglecting many important questions such as the development of different sensory modalities, the role of imagery and the role of innate constraints on development. Nevertheless, it showed how the unified theory of meaning presented in this article can be linked to possible developmental stages in human childhood, standing in a broadly analogous relationship to human evolution. The characteristics of these stages are outlined in Table 3 , which has clear similarities with Table 2 , summarizing the features of the four phylogenetic stages. The theory of meaning outlined in this article can now be used to address the classical question "What, if any, kind of artificial system would be capable of meaning?" This is also the question I addressed in earlier work (Zlatev 2001a (Zlatev , 2001b ), but as we will see, the answer that follows from the present theory is quite different.
As pointed out in Section 1, the issue concerning of the nature of meaning, as opposed to providing some "operational definition", is most often bracketed rather than directly addressed within Artificial Intelligence (AI) (e.g. Turing, 1950) . This is even the case in more avantgarde approaches of AI such as 'situated robotics ' (e.g. Hendriks-Jansen, 1996; Clark, 1997; Brooks et al., 1999) , emphasizing notions such as 'embodiment' and 'autonomy' (cf. Ziemke and Sharkey, 2001) .
To the extent that such artificial systems, e.g. 'autonomous agents' (e.g. Dautenhahn, 1999) or 'epigenetic robots' , Prince et al., 2002 are presented as candidates of systems capable of meaning, the latter tends to be defined as some sort of interaction with the environment or a form of 'grounding' (Harnad, 1990) . When compared to traditional AI with its preprogrammed 'rules and representations' , sometimes called GOFAI, i.e. 'Good Old Fashioned AI' (Haugeland, 1985) and criticized strongly by e.g. Dreyfus (1979) and Searle (1980) for laying false claims to concepts such as 'intelligence' and 'understanding' , such new trends may be regarded as a step in the right direction (Emmeche, 2001; Ziemke and Sharkey, 2001; Ziemke, 2002) . Unlike the 'representations' of GOFAI, which had any meaning only for those who programmed them or else knew what they meant, the 'internal states' of robots with sensors and effectors can be rightly said to stand in a causal relation with the physical environment, and this relation can even be established developmentally through a process of 'robotogenesis' (Zlatev, 2001a; Kozima and Yano, 2001) , i.e. a form of 'artificial ontogenesis' (Ziemke, 2002) .
Nevertheless, it is seldom asked, and hardly ever satisfactorily answered: why should such a causal relation be equivalent to, or give rise to meaning? Which brings us back to Square 1: Can an artificial system have meaning, and if so how should it be designed or created? In a precursor to the present article (Zlatev, 2001b) , departing from similar (though not identical) theses as those stated in Section 2, I suggested that the crucial condition for any system, natural or artificial, to have meaning is that:
(1) It must have an internal value system controlling its perception, behavior and learning autonomously.
According to a liberal definition of 'internal value system' and 'autonomy' , a large class of systems with internal control mechanisms, i.e. cybernetic systems (Weiner, 1958) would fulfill this condition, e.g. the "artificial creatures" of Ackley and Littman (1992) and Balkenius (1995) . However, I observed, all existing artificial meaning systems where either of the cue-based type, or at most of a rather simple variant of the associational type, based on some version of 'reinforcement learning' (Barto, 1992) . On the other hand, all those which attempted the two higher levels of meaning where clearly non-autonomous, and hence could only be viewed as models, rather than as instantiations of meaning systems, e.g. the 'imitation learning' robots of Billard and Hayes (1998) or the 'language grounding' agents of Steels and Vogt (1997) and Steels (1999) . According to the meaning-as-value theory presented in this article, this interpretation is if anything much too liberal, and condition (1) should be strengthened (at least) with the following extra condition that needs to be fulfilled before meaning can be attributed to a system: (2) This value system must be intrinsic to the system in the sense that it serves to preserve the system's organization, rather than criteria which are external to the system (defined by the system's designers).
While many cybernetic systems fulfil, to various degrees, condition (1) as pointed out already, it is my understanding that there is no current artificial system that satisfies condition (2), while any living system does so. Hence, there are no artificial meaning systems, even of the simplest kinds, and meaning is coextensional with life! This rather strong statement requires some more justification… The reasons for my (partial) change of view since the proclamation of the research program of 'epigenetic robotics' (Zlatev, 2001a; Zlatev and Balkenius, 2001) , and reaching the conclusion above (which has been applauded by one part of the community and scolded by the other) lie above all in my greater appreciation of the work of theoretical biologists such as von Uexküll (1982 Uexküll ( [1940 ) and Maturana and Varela (1980) , especially as interpreted and related to the concerns of AI in a series of recent articles by Tom Ziemke and colleagues (Ziemke and Sharkey, 2001; Ziemke 2001a Ziemke , 2001b Ziemke , 2002 Ziemke , 2003 Lindblom and Ziemke, in press ).
The point is that despite the fact that machines are becoming (i.e. being made) increasingly more 'self-organizing' , 'adaptable' , 'embodied' etc. there remains a categorical distinction between organisms and machines, reflected in condition (2) above, and which finds expressions in related differences such as the following: -Organisms are autopoietic, i.e. they actively preserve their organization as a dynamic unity, to which goal all other processes are subordinate. Machines are allopoietic, i.e. they consist of a concatenation of processes which are designed to produce something other than the organization of the machine itself (Maturana and Varela, 1980) . Or as Ziemke and Sharkey (2001) explicate:
An autopoietic system is a special type of homeostatic machine for which the fundamental variable to be maintained constant is its own organization. This is unlike regular homeostatic machines, which typically maintain single variables, such as temperature or pressure.
(ibid., p. 733) -Organisms develop centrifugally, "from the inside out", with the result that all parts form an indivisible unity. Machines are developed centripetally, from independently constructed parts, combined according to an external design plan (von Uexküll, 1982) . There are, in fact, current attempts to 'evolve' robot bodies and 'brains' in an integrated manner that could be considered 'centrifugal' to some degree (e.g. Lipson & Pollack, 2000) , but this does not remove the gap, as explained by Ziemke (2001b) :
[T]here is no growth and adaptation is the individual robot body. Instead body plans are first evolved in the computer, i.e. 'outside' the robot, and then implemented in a robot body. In von Uexküll's terms, the evolution of the body plan might have followed centrifugal principles, the resulting robot bodies are, however, still built in a centripetal fashion and from then on can no longer self-organize. (ibid., p. 80) -Organisms evolve over long periods of time by being subject to natural selection, where the only 'criterion of success' is their viability and/or successful reproduction. This, on its part, guarantees that they have a 'correct' (in the sense of 'viable') 'representation' of the world, because those without one are simply eliminated. 9 Machines, if not explicitly constructed according to an external design plan (see above) are subjected to a kind of "simulated evolution" by their designers, which guarantees no epistemic relation between machine and world whatsoever (Edelman, 1992) . Ziemke (2001a) again provides an enlightening explication:
[I]n the organism's case viability in the biological sense of survival and viability in the sense of fit between behavioral/conceptual mechanisms and experience are closely connected. A robot, on the other hand … 'lacks' the intrinsic requirement of biological viability. Hence, the viability of its behavioral/conceptual mechanisms can ultimately always be evaluated from the outside (with respect to fitness function, reinforcement, error measures etc.) Thus, for the robot the only criterion of success or failure is till the designer's and/or observer's evaluation or interpretation, i.e. this criterion is entirely extrinsic to the robot. (ibid., p. 220) As seen from these attempts to characterize the difference between living and artificial systems: autopoiesis, 'centrifugal' growth, evolution -central characteristics of the living -all deal with certain intrinsic characteristics to the organism, which are absent in a mechanism. A central one of these properties, I suggest here, is that of an intrinsic value system, and since meaning is based on value according to the theory proposed in this article, only organisms will have intrinsic meaning. Or to formulate my version of the categorical distinction between life and machine:
-Organisms have intrinsic value systems through which they evaluate aspects of the environment and their own actions in terms of the overarching goal of preserving their organization and consequently have intrinsic meaning. Machines have nothing of the kind, and in the best case only have models of value systems, i.e. their designers' hypotheses of what organisms' value systems consist of. Hence, they can only be regarded as models of (organisms with) meaning systems.
Since none of the "artificial organisms" reviewed by Ziemke and Sharkey (2001) or the "virtual organisms" inhabiting the field of Artificial Life (Ward, 1999) fulfil any of the conditions for being organisms outlined above, we must conclude that they are mechanisms without intrinsic meaning. This conclusion is similar to that of Ziemke and Sharkey (2001) and Ziemke (2001a Ziemke ( , 2001b , but these authors were content to point out the fact that there (still) are differences between AI-style 'autonomous systems' and real organisms, and only used this as a basis to question whether the first really can possess meaning. It is also similar to that of Emmeche (2001) , who provides a negative answer to the question "Does a robot have an Umwelt"? But since an Umwelt is, at least according to Emmeche, always qualitative, i.e. involving phenomenal experience, this is also a weaker conclusion than the present one. I am not only arguing that robots and computer programs have no consciousness in any of its manifestations -of course they don't, but it is devilishly hard to prove it, and even harder to convince those who believe that they do, because of the firstperson ontology of subjective experience -I am arguing that they lack the capacity for meaning, which is (a) arguably a prerequisite for consciousness and (b) can be established by objective and intersubjective criteria. Does this also mean that artificial meaning systems are impossible in principle? It depends on what is meant by 'artificial' . If it implies notions such as 'allopoietic' , 'centripetal' and 'constructed' I would answer "Yes". But if it means simply 'brought about (in part) by Man' , or 'built up of other kinds of atoms than those in real organisms' the answer is 'No' . In fact, I would propose that an artificial system that "passes the test" by possessing the crucial characteristics of organisms outlined in this section, i.e. belongs to the class of autopoietic, centrifugally developing, evolving systems with an intrinsic value system, should be regarded as a true artificial organism. Only then would artificial meaning become reality.
Since these are the basic features which Ziemke (2001b Ziemke ( , 2003 attributes to 'organismic embodiment' another way of stating the conclusion is that if the notion of 'artificial life' is to be taken literally, then it must aim at creating systems with organismic embodiment. In my proposal of a research program for the 'epigenesis of meaning in robots' (Zlatev, 2001a) I stated that one of the preconditions for meaning is 'naturalistic embodiment', leaving it somewhat vague what exactly would count as 'naturalistic'. Admittedly, my understanding of 'the natural' at that time was rather limited, and Ziemke's (2002) critique of my underestimation of biology at that time is valid. However, a synthesis of our ideas can possibly be obtained by now equating 'naturalistic' and 'organismic' embodiment.
Since there seem to be no a priori reasons why 'true artificial organisms' should be impossible, it is not unlikely that they will indeed 'emerge' in the future. Based on the theory proposed in this article, it can be predicted that the first type will be creatures with cue-based meaning, and despite the potential to speed up evolution 'artificially' , it would probably take long before any kind of associational creatures see the light of day. From then on, however, there are still the two 'revolutions' leading first to mimetic and then to symbolic meaning. This whole process took evolution over 2 billion years of first natural and, finally, biocultural evolution. With all the ingenuity of the human 'creators' and the artificial life forms -how much can that be compressed into? Another difficulty is that if we really succeed in creating true artificial life, than, just like real life, it will be autonomous, and we (like God) will have to step back and watch our creation evolve, in ways which are not completely predictable, by definition. We could hardly know in advance whether this evolution would lead to 'loving' creatures such as the robot-child David from the Kubrick-Spielberg film AI rather than to … the 'autonomous' Agent Smith from The Matrix. Both qualify as 'true artificial organisms' . And luckily, both will continue to remain science fiction for the foreseeable future, and possibly forever.
This prognosis stands in stark contrast to the current enthusiasm in the 'new AI' concerning programs and robots that are claimed to be already capable of 'autonomous learning' (Barto, 1992; Balkenius, 1995) , 'imitation' (Schall, 1999; Dautenhahn and Nehaniv, 2002) , 'emotive social interaction' (Breazeal, 2000) and 'language' (Steels and Vogt, 1997) , Steels (1999) .
Why this huge discrepancy between such optimistic appraisals of the potential of machines, on the one hand, and the realism (not pessimism) of scholars like Searle, Ziemke, Emmeche and myself? I would suggest two possible explanations, the first one more innocent, the second more insidious.
The 'innocent' reason can be seen in those who over-interpret their systems and attribute to them meaning, emotions, consciousness etc. What they can be said to be doing is confusing 'the map for the territory': while such systems can have huge value as models of cognitive systems by helping us understand various (dynamic) features of categories such as 'intelligence' and 'meaning' , that is quite different from saying that they actually possess these features. To do the latter would be a case of the 'Pygmalion Syndrome' (Emmeche, 2001) . Another way in which robots and other artificial systems would have practical 'value' (for us!) would be as artefacts, which is the direction in which 'epigenetic robotics' seems to be moving (http://www.epigenetic-robotics.org/). In both respects, as models and as tools, they serve us as a form of 'Weak' as opposed to 'Strong AI' (Searle, 1980 (Searle, , 1995 cf. also Ziemke 2001a cf. also Ziemke , 2001b .
The second reason for optimism among some AI practitioners which I find quite more disturbing is rather the opposite: instead of over-interpreting the machines, they underestimate us and other organisms. The argument is always some version of the claim that if you can get a machine to produce intelligentlooking behavior, than who cares whether it has "mysterious properties" such as meaning, intentionality and consciousness. In fact, it can be seen as a proof that such properties are epiphenomenal or simply non-existent (Dennett, 1991) . Thus, life is effectively reduced to mechanism, and human beings dehumanized.
Summary and conclusions
The goal of this article has been an ambitious one: to propose the outlines of a unified multidisciplinary theory of meaning, which both allows for the existence of a continuum of meaning in all living beings, and at the same time provides a basis for dividing the concept of meaning in (at least) four different types: cue-based, associational, mimetic and symbolic. It has been argued that these four types of meaning are based on different value systems, constituting a hierarchy that is both evolutionary and ontogenetic. It was shown that there are significant parallels between the history of the species, phylogeny, and that of the individual, ontogeny, and that this parallelism is motivated not by an ad hoc principle of 'recapitulation' , but by the epigenetic character of ontogenetic development itself. Finally, implications for the meaning potential of artificial systems were spelled out.
The major theoretical implications from the proposed theory can be divided in two kinds. The first kind concerns the basic conditions for any kind of meaning, and includes the following conclusions:
-All organisms are capable of meaning, though not of the same type.
-Only organisms are capable of meaning, i.e. there is no meaning outside of life. -The only kind of artificial systems capable of intrinsic meaning are true artificial organisms, autopoietic, centrifugally developing, evolving systems with intrinsic value. -Machines, which are systems lacking the above properties, can only simulate but not instantiate meaning.
These four conclusions can be synthesized, somewhat dramatically, in the first part of the title of the article: Meaning = Life. However, the conclusion that meaning is coextensive with life does not mean that all meaning is reducible to biology. It was repeatedly argued that for creatures capable of culture, i.e. acquired value systems consisting largely of conventional signs, with imitation playing a crucial role for their transmission, meaning becomes a complex biocultural phenomenon. This applies to 'mimetic creatures' like apes and definitely for 'symbolic creatures' like ourselves. In these cases 'natural' meaning, based on innate values (and learned associations), is complemented with conventional meaning, shared among the participants of a community: Meaning = Life + Culture.
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The problem, with this schematic formulation, however, is that it may be taken as suggesting that the different kinds of meaning, the natural and the cultural, can be easily teased apart. On the contrary, it has been argued that they are quite integrated, so that in us human beings, 'nature is adapted for culture' and at the same time culture can 'tame' (rather than just suppress, as Freud believed) nature. From this latter perspective, a number of implications of theoretical significance could be drawn from the proposed theory, but given the provisional status of most of the evolutionary and developmental evidence appealed to, they are best regarded as hypotheses for further investigation:
-Relatively small evolutionary changes in the innate value system, stimulating and 'rewarding' imitation and mimesis, could have enormous consequences for learning abilities and emotionality. This could account for why even small genetic differences (human beings vs. chimpanzees) and subtle developmental disorders (autism) can have enormous importance for 'theory of mind' and empathy. -A biological adaptation such as a 'mirror neuron system' is probably crucial for the development of intersubjectivity, the ability to share mental and emotional states. On its part, intersubjectivity appears to be a necessary condition for acquiring shared, conventional meaning: "X means for you what it means for me". Such conventional meaning is at first mimetic and eventually symbolic, i.e. language. -When conventional meaning systems, both mimetic and symbolic, are internalized by the individual, the resulting semiotic mediation 'stands between' the organism and the immediate world. Thus, the world becomes to a large extent 'mediate' for this individual, and his consciousness more (self) reflective and potentially free from biological value. -The higher level of conventionality, systematicity and arbitrariness of symbols compared to both signals and mimetic schemas, allows creatures with symbolic meaning systems more creativity and 'ungrounding' from their primary value systems. This can have a positive effect on reflexivity and freedom, as pointed out above, but it can also have negative consequences for the organism and, in the worst case, for the existence of life on earth itself.
To conclude, in the same way that decoupling biological and cultural value can have disastrous consequences for the individual, the present 'cold war' concerning Human Nature between the humanities and the social sciences on the one side, and the biological sciences on the other side, with the first throwing accusations of "biologism!" and "reductionism!" and the second replying with "obscurantism!", is bound to be detrimental for our self-understanding, (and is symptomatic for the state of Western culture). My belief is that by endeavoring to develop a unified biocultural theory of meaning, this rift can be mended and a higher synthesis in our knowledge reached. I hope this article has contributed at least a little in this direction.
